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n Close Reading: An Introduction to Literature, Elisabeth Howe states,  
 
A close reading analyzes poems or short passages of prose 
in depth. It is also called explication, a word from a Latin 
verb meaning ‘to unfold.’ Explication unfolds the text’s 
meaning in relation to its formal and structural elements; it 
allows you the student—and indeed any reader—to 
examine the language and structure of a work as a function 
of its content, i.e., of the ideas, images or emotions it 
expresses.1  
 
In How to Read a Poem Terry Eagleton begins by saying,  
 
The idea that literary theorists killed poetry dead because 
with their shriveled hearts and swollen brains they are 
incapable of spotting a metaphor, let alone a tender feeling, 
is one of the more obtuse critical platitudes of our time. The 
truth is that almost all major literary theorists engage in 
scrupulously close reading. . . Close reading is not the issue. 
The question is not how tenaciously you cling to the text, 
but what you are in search of when you do so.2  
 
What I find of particular value in these two quotes is the way they contrast the 
difference between epistemologies: Howe’s approach to close reading—
admittedly an approach aimed at and written for undergraduates—assumes a 
structural analysis that can be undertaken in discrete, manageable chunks, by any 
dedicated reader. Eagleton’s text, by contrast, doesn’t simply argue for the 
necessity of considering the politicization of language but reminds us it is always 
already there. The theoretical underpinnings that define and bound this practice 
of “close reading” and also the epistemological roads to interpretation are more 
than a matter of academic squabbling or mere ideological difference. Form, 
function, and content are all important pieces of the textual puzzle but, as Eagleton 
points out, they exist within discourse and to forget that is to willfully blind 
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Reading and interpretation—acts not synonymous with criticism but 
necessary precursors—are acts of meaning-making. Ann Berthoff states,  
 
When we read critically, we are reading for meaning—and 
that is not the same thing as reading for “message.” 
Meanings are not things, and finding them is not like going 
on an Easter egg hunt. Meanings are relationships: they are 
unstable, shifting, dynamic; they do not stay still nor can we 
prove the authenticity or the validity of one or another 
meaning that we find.3  
 
The epistemology of reading, therefore, is not a positivistic pursuit. When 
undertaking the act of meaning-making through analysis, critical readers learn not 
to find the “right” answer, but rather to consider the multiplicity of answers 
inherent in a text—a multiplicity which takes shape into individual meanings 
through a variety of ideological schemata that structure and bound not only the 
text itself, but also the imaginative possibilities of the critical reader. 
We engage in these schemata in part by choosing our theoretical lens: we 
prioritize ideologies and space/time to narrow and focus the chaos of meaning 
thereby allowing textual dialogues to form around particular nexus points. Do we 
historicize and if so how? Do we discuss form, content, or both? Do we 
consider/use/teach this edition or that one? Do we attempt to remove the critical 
speaker from the conversation or acknowledge that all knowledge is formed, 
disseminated, and debated by human beings? These are not small questions and, 
whether they are explicitly acknowledged in a conversation or not, they drive how 
we close read, what meaning we make while close reading, and what conclusions 
seem not only logical but possible. If close reading is taught as a method of reading 
for message instead of making meaning, it becomes employed as an approach to 
textual interpretation that leads to quantifiable knowledge—a method understood 
to produce predictable, quantifiable results if undertaken with appropriate 
rigorous thought (see the S.A.T.).  Within this construction close reading is a tool 
of logical positivism and tied to explicating only what can be certain. Every answer 
to an English test cannot be “all of the above if argued with cleverness.” The 
S.A.T. and other mandated assessments create a hierarchy of knowledge where 
“literary interpretation” becomes synonymous with “answer” and “right.” This 
forces the acts of reading and interpretation to conform to a positivistic model. 
One example of positivistic close reading are the No Fear Shakespeare 
“translations.” No Fear Shakespeare is a product of the company SparkNotes (a 
subsidiary of Barnes & Noble) which offers online synopsis and textual 
breakdowns as well as “test prep” and released their line of Shakespeare 
“translations” starting in 2003. No Fear Shakespeare bills their “translations” as 
“plain english” that “anyone can read.” Difficulties with presenting Shakespeare 
in secondary classrooms are often reported as stemming from an inability to relate 
to the text which renders understanding, and therefore meaning-making, 
impossible. In her online article for Buzzfeed, “Why I Hate Shakespeare,” Krystie 
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sifted through the yellow, plastic hardcover book that creaked with each turn of 
the page, and all I learned was that Early Modern English hurt my brain and I 
couldn’t seem to wrap my head around it.”4 Yandoli goes on to share a moment 
and sentiment experienced by countless students struggling with Shakespeare in 
the classroom when she says, “I didn’t rely on SparkNotes because I wanted to 
cheat my way through it; I simply wanted to understand what was going on in 
words and terms that were tangible to me.”5 For Yandoli turning to SparkNotes 
was close reading; it was through SparkNotes that she was able to explicate the 
text. Berthoff states that “meanings don’t just happen: we make them; we find and 
form them”6 and Levi-Strauss argues that to mean “means the ability of any kind 
of data to be translated in a different language…different words on a different 
level.”7 No Fear Shakespeare was Yandoli’s “different words on a different level” 
and she made meaning of Shakespeare, she examined the ideas, images and 
emotions expressed, by turning to SparkNotes as a reader of the Bedford or 
Norton editions would turn to footnotes. 
This is what No Fear Shakespeare claims to offer on their first page. Their 
close reading has led to a translation into “the kind of English people actually 
speak today.”8 In bold black letters at the top of the page are the words “FEAR 
NOT.” They then make an appeal to students such as Yandoli, asking, “Have you 
ever found yourself looking at a Shakespeare play, then down at the footnotes, 
then back at the play, and still not understanding? You know what the individual 
words mean, but they don’t add up.”9 Through SparkNotes a young reader, much 
like Yandoli with Hamlet, is promised not only understanding of the play, but also 
the ability to read “Shakespeare’s own words fearlessly” and to “actually [enjoy] 
it.”10 Sparknotes’ side-by-side “translation” helps students “sort out what’s 
happening, who’s saying what, and why.”11 However, while Shakespeare is 
rendered tangible to students like Yandoli, the positivistic “translation” is not an 
ideologically neutral act and “we have to be alert to the fact that meanings can be 
arrived at too quickly, the possibility of other meanings being too abruptly 
foreclosed.”12 To see the consequences of these foreclosures I turn to Macbeth and 
a comparison of the Bedford edition and the No Fear Shakespeare “translation.” 
The first lines of Lady Macbeth’s speech from 1.5 in the Bedford edition 
of Macbeth are, “The raven himself is hoarse / That croaks the fatal entrance of 
Duncan / Under my battlements.”13 By contrast the No Fear Shakespeare edition 
of Macbeth “translates” these lines as, “So the messenger is short of breath, like a 
hoarse raven, as he announces Duncan’s entrance into my fortress, where he will 
die.” The symbol of the raven as the messenger, one which carries multiple 
allegorical overtones as it intersects with images of the raven as harbinger or carrier 
of the dead, is lost entirely as the messenger ceases to be the raven, and instead 
simply sounds like a “hoarse raven.” The literal meaning of the text, that a message 
has arrived, is made explicit at the cost of foreshadowing, theme, and imagery. The 
shift from “fatal entrance of Duncan” to “Duncan’s entrance. . .where he will die” 
also changes how these lines fit thematically with larger allusions to fate; in the 
Bedford, Duncan’s fate is sealed the moment he enters “under [her] battlements” 
as opposed to the No Fear Shakespeare where Duncan enters, and will—
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prophecy the point at which Duncan dies is far less precise than Macbeth’s off-
stage murder between 2.1 and 2.2. There are also a host of interesting overtones 
in the phrase “Duncan’s entrance into my fortress” that play in fascinating ways 
into the alteration of Lady Macbeth’s gender performance that aren’t necessarily 
present in “under my battlements.”  
The problem here is not that No Fear Shakespeare rewrites 
Shakespeare—cinematic adaptations, fandom, and modern theater productions 
decide which lines to keep, cut, and edit; the issue is the subject position held by 
No Fear Shakespeare’s “translations” and the way those translations uphold a 
positivistic notion of reading for message. There is a mighty need for a product to 
render Shakespeare “tangible,” to ease the “hurt brain,” and capitalism has 
produced a product to fill this need. The understanding of the play offered by No 
Fear Shakespeare still allows a classroom to explore the legitimacy of the witches’ 
prophecy: would Macbeth have become king regardless because it was destined to 
be true? And if prophecy is real and destiny written, how can we know if Macbeth 
made the choice to kill Duncan or if that choice was taken from him? Interesting, 
philosophical conversations can follow, students gain the cultural literacy of 
Macbeth and the history of what it means to be “human,” debates over 
consciousness and free will, and the role the Early Modern period and Shakespeare 
played in shaping our current understandings of those issues can be discussed. 
Yandoli can wrap her head around this. These are words and terms that are 
tangible.  
However, because No Fear Shakespeare relies on a simplified, literal 
“translation” of Macbeth the figurative nature of language—all of the uncertainty 
present in any signification until a particular usage ties that signification to meaning 
through context and ideological schemata—is pruned to guarantee certainty. No 
Fear Shakespeare cannot allow uncertainty of meaning because “chaos is scary”14 
and it is “absolutely impossible to conceive of meaning without order.”15 No Fear 
Shakespeare is not one director/editor/critic’s interpretation of Shakespeare; it is 
the authoritative reading of Barnes & Noble—a capitalist institution of 
knowledge—promising any reader understanding. Duncan is coming to the castle. 
He will be murdered. Lady Macbeth is not nice. This pruning to certainty allows 
meaning to be made of Shakespeare, but forecloses on any meanings that must be 
approached through ambiguity or unfurled through uncertain consideration. In 
the case of No Fear Shakespeare, what can be explicated from the text through 
close reading is not designed for the discovery and generation of meaning; it is 
merely a logical puzzle with one, most logical, answer. 
With increasing pressures to produce an educational product as quantified 
and qualified through state and nationally administered assessment, No Fear 
Shakespeare may be the only viable answer unless educational practices and 
mandated assessments of what meanings are allowed to be made are reevaluated. 
For many readers like Yandoli, the difficulty of Shakespeare is not something to 
be overcome or struggled with, but a gateway to pass through, a stamp of 
accomplishment. The literacies of history, allusion, and classical mythology 
necessary to understand jokes, characterization, and plot devices are woefully out 
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served. The message communicated about Shakespeare from his placement on 
tests, gatekeeping entry into higher education, to his jokes being misread and 
appropriated as “high art” is that Shakespeare has value because not everyone can 
understand him. And that is true, not everyone can understand him, but the 
reasons for that lack—or impossibility—of understanding are what should be 
pressed on. Pressing on those reasons begins by reexamining how we closely read 
Shakespeare. 
What Yandoli could not have understood in sixth grade and what is 
missing in any definition of close reading as something “any reader” can do, are 
the competing discourses and assumed value-judgements before the act of 
“reading” even begins. Yandoli’s phrase “hurt my brain,” so easily overlooked and 
dismissed, is actually a moment to dig in to. Yandoli is self-aware of this dismissal 
when she says, “I walked into class the next day and didn’t tell any of my classmates 
what I did—because I thought I was alone, dumb, and probably way in over my 
head.”16 More is at work in the case of Yandoli and countless others like her than 
an inability to explicate, and the intersection of close reading and Shakespeare 
presents an interesting avenue for exploring it. While chaos is scary and uncertainty 
frustrating, a plethora of meanings are waiting to be made—Berthoff argues that, 
“the meanings that emerge from [chaos], which can be discerned taking shape 
within it, can be discovered only if students who are learning . . . can learn to 
tolerate ambiguity.”17 Close reading is tenaciously clinging to a text, turning the 
words and significations into anchor points, “points of reference which might 
allow us to navigate, with some semblance of intention and confidence, towards 
some clearly perceived goals.”18 But clinging to the text does not mean limiting 
what we might be in search of as we do; if close reading is detached from an idea 
of finding the “right” answer and reimagined as a method for generating meaning 
it becomes an avenue into the uncertain and exploration of the uncertain is what 
pushes on and rewrites discursive boundaries of what’s possible and, therefore, 
real. 
There is a boundary, or, perhaps a more apt metaphor, there are the places 
from and within which a reader can make meaning. Away from and outside of 
those places there is chaos. This chaos has as many names as philosophers who 
have named it and, if knowledge is conceived as metaphorically linear, then we 
need only understand this place—observe it, define it, and control it—to better 
understand our thinking. This conception of knowledge is precisely what Derrida 
argues against, however, through critiques of the origin. Rather than conceive of 
knowledge as linear, I imagine this chaos as the center Derrida theorized holds 
structures in place; these structures are then bounded through what Foucault 
names “discursive boundaries” and the meaning that can be made is in turn limited 
to what material exists within the bounded structure. The post-structuralist view 
of language altered the discursive boundaries allowing previously inconceivable 
meaning to be made; suddenly language—and alongside language all thought, 
knowledge, and signification—was an “endless play of signifiers which [could] 
never be . . . nailed down to a single centre, essence or meaning.”19 And yet, despite 
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they are what we think with.”20 This means signifiers don’t have to be nailed down 
because they are always already bounded. The center always holds. 
I think meaning cannot be made without the center so I am not arguing 
to loosen it; with no structure there is no order and without order no meaning-
making. However, what the center holds—or perhaps even the center itself—
could be rewritten. To explore this idea I am using a conceptual metaphor of 
space, working from Lakoff and Nunez’s definition that a “conceptual metaphor 
is a cognitive mechanism for allowing us to reason about one kind of thing as if it 
were another.”21 I imagine knowing to be as vast and far-reaching as a universe: 
the discursive boundaries are the limits of what I can see and observe—outside 
my known universe could exist anything, so there must be a balance between 
useful exploration and wild tales of signification beyond the trace. One thread 
waiting to be tugged on is the piece holding this conceptual universe together; that 
thing is myth—it is like a dark energy that cannot be seen or measured in and of 
itself, but its effects and consequences are visible through the ideologies and 
structures it generates and is regenerated by. This understanding of myth builds 
from Jung, Levi-Strauss, Barthes, and others and can be seen as it takes shape in 
the theorizing of what Levi-Strauss described as “get[ting] thought in man 
unbeknownst to him.”22 Myth is not the origin or the center; myths are the 
particles that allow those pieces of the structures to form, eventually building 
structures from that. There is nothing necessarily new in this conception of myth, 
but it is a conception which has allowed me to make meaning. Eagleton points out 
in After Theory, “we are living now in the aftermath of what one might call high 
theory. . . . The older generation . . . proved a hard act to follow. . . . For the 
moment, however, we are still trading on the past.”23 My point is not to say 
something new because I am not sure anything is ever really “new;” rather, I think 
meaning seems new when the limits of our knowing change and shift revealing 
territory previously inaccessible to a particular discursive community at a particular 
moment in space-time. 
In her book, A Short History of Myth, Karen Armstrong argues a myth “is 
true because it is effective not because it gives us factual information.”24 The 
meaning generated because of and in conjunction with myth is recognized as valid 
if the particles form pieces that effectively feel ordered. Historically, we look for 
rationale that justifies that ordering rather than considering why it seemed ordered 
in the first place. Barthes states that “Myth is a system of communication . . . it is 
a message” and “myth is not defined by the object of its message, but by the way 
in which it utters this message.”25 Myths generate meanings which build ordered 
structures and, from that, perceived reality. Armstrong says that “myth is about 
the unknown; it is about that for which initially we have no words” and that “myth 
is not a story for its own sake. It shows us how we should behave.”26 Mythic 
structure is another kind of anchor point; as Derrida pointed out, the only material 
we have to work with is the material that’s already there. This is why the quest for 
certainty is also a quest in support of myth. Catherine Belsey states that “existing 
meanings are not ours to command. . . . To reproduce existing meanings exactly 
is also to reaffirm the knowledges our culture takes for granted, and the values 
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against a specific myth, but there are always more myths bounding the 
construction of any critique. We cannot make meaning without myth (at least so 
far as I can tell); it bonds the atoms of order together so that they can hold shape. 
We can, however, remythologize it. 
If every possible answer exists in symbiotic relationship with the current 
formulations of myth and what we want—or even need—is to remythologize, 
then uncertainty is one way of imagining the impossible into being and close 
reading for the goal of being uncertain—with the anchor point of text it 
provides—can be a key methodology for boldly going who knows where. With 
these ideas in mind—the relationship between myth and meaning-making and the 
uses of close reading for discovery and analysis of uncertainty—I return to Yandoli 
and Shakespeare. 
I begin with the question how do we logically engage in the illogical? In 
the case of Yandoli, why does Shakespeare (as have many other texts for many 
other students) hurt her brain? Something is at work in Yandoli’s narrative that 
indicates explication of the text was not only difficult but impossible; furthermore, 
her inability to explicate Shakespeare goes on to affect her sense of worth as 
described when she states, “throughout my entire academic career and even in 
professional circles, I couldn’t help but feel insecure about my lack of enthusiasm 
for Shakespeare.”28 This can be explained in part through access to various 
literacies and systemic power structures as embodied through education and 
cultural value, but I think there is more than one myth of power at work and they 
are exerting a number of influences that directly affect Yandoli’s, and anyone 
else’s, ability to “close read.” 
I want to focus on the intersection of three myths at work here: they are 
the myth of Shakespeare making meaning about what kind of people “get” 
Shakespeare; the myth of education about what “smart” readers and “good” 
students are able to accomplish, and the myth of knowledge limiting the 
possibilities of meaning-making and driving that need to find “the right” answer. 
All of these are intersecting and applying pressure through culture, the classroom, 
and the teacher, and this pressure coalesces into power. One of the side-effects of 
this power can be a “hurt” brain. Students are asked to accomplish a task they are 
incapable of completing with a text that intimidates and is inaccessible to them 
under pressure from the unstated but omnipresent belief that their value and 
intelligence are tied to their ability to succeed. 
No Fear Shakespeare is the inevitable result of an epistemology that 
bounded and purposed close reading as a tool for policing interpretation. It is 
implied that if one is literate then one need only understand what words mean and 
put the puzzle together, and a word’s meaning is encapsulated within the multitude 
of precise definitions available in a dictionary. Of course, words have more than 
one definition, and they don’t always mean what they mean—sometimes they are 
used figuratively. And then there is tone, the inflection and the changing of 
meaning through the context of a text—and context must often be sussed out and 
understood through the variety of intersecting literacies a reader brings with them 
(including but not limited to: cultural, mythological, dialect, historical). But myths 
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capitalist notions of “product” demand an epistemology of reading and 
interpretation that produce singular, precise answers, and in order to ensure this 
there must be a technique built from an observable process that produces the same 
result each time. An understanding of close reading that maintains “any dedicated 
reader” can explicate “any text” generates the requirement of a product that makes 
texts tangible; and No Fear Shakespeare, by removing the need for readers to 
grapple and struggle with unfamiliar language or the frustrating imprecision of 
figurative language, ensures more readers who cannot explicate difficult texts no 
matter how dedicated. Myths of knowledge as precise are regenerated and tendrils 
of power that reach into education, consumer culture, academia, and elsewhere 
perpetuate unnoticed. Students are still over-tested and under-funded; reading is 
still about message not meaning-making; memorization and reproduction, not 
creativity and imagination, remain most rewarded. 
Armstrong argues “there is never a single, orthodox version of a myth,” 
and indeed there is no single, orthodox version of Shakespeare. 29 But there are 
the pressures of authority, fed by myths of authenticity, that equate difficulty with 
quality in learning. I think there is a conflation here, however; making meaning 
out of chaos is always a struggle and struggle is difficult, but not all difficulties 
“hurt the brain” in the same way. The subjective aesthetics of the Romantics are 
often criticized for offering little in the way of rigorous thought but the hyper-
positivism of the twentieth century has not proved much better. Northrop Frye’s 
appeals to the necessity of criticism show a particular notion of rigor as the answer 
to malleable subjectivity. Frye argues that criticism must be a “structure of thought 
and knowledge . . . in its own right, with some measure of independence from the 
art it deals with,”30 and that “[t]he presence of science in any subject changes its 
character from the casual to the causal, from the random and intuitive to the 
systematic, as well as safe-guarding the integrity of that subject from external 
invasions.”31 Systematic. Causal. Integrity. This process preserves the integrity of 
objectivity and good science. Good science is good thinking and that is something 
good students do. Failure to think this way is failure to produce worthwhile, 
serious thought. Centuries of systemic power fed by myths of knowledge as they 
have been formed and given structure in Western philosophies press down on 
sixth graders and their unenthusiastic response is misread as lack of appreciation. 
No wonder brains hurt. 
No Fear Shakespeare is the antithesis of Frye, but it is simultaneously the 
inevitable result of tightly guarded boundaries of knowledge—fueled in part by 
arguments like Frye’s—which generate competitive need to be “one of the good 
ones.” However, if scholarly criticism were to pursue meaning-making not in 
competition but as an act of loving discovery and comparison through 
conversation then we could loosen the boundaries of knowledge. This is not 
weakness but the strength to brave the paths of uncertainty and to help others 
learn to build them; that is the act of educators, not gate-keeping against such 
explorations because they are “immature,” or “over-simplified,” or subjective. 
This is why the repurposing of close reading from a method of policing 
meaning to one of exploration is so exciting; close reading forces a reader to deal 
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the possibilities of meaning and carves a path that can be followed creating more 
space from which critiques of critiques may be pursued. So long as we remember 
close reading is not the revelation and solving of the puzzle but the generation of 
it, that there are as many puzzles as there are readers, it becomes a discursive act 
with recognizable limits. Readers employing close reading can only explicate the 
meanings their individual socio-political positions allow them access to, but in 
recognizing that it remains one of the best techniques of logical analysis and can 
now be repurposed as a tool for discovering what we can’t know. 
Thinking rigorously about what we don’t know or can’t know is as useful 
as arguing for what seems true; there is value in trying to imagine the impossible 
into being. I do not think it is enough to explicate what we know; I think we must 
begin to explicate, as specifically as possible, what we do not know as well. This is 
an important point because as myth generates meaning it feeds the Foucauldian 
discursive boundaries which in turn limit and bound what is conceptualized—
what can even be imagined. The systemic sense of “rightness” afforded No Fear 
Shakespeare and its prizing of certainty through literality demonstrates the 
dangerous bounding of both the real and the possible in its close reading for 
message and subsequent “translation” of Lady Macbeth and her gender 
performance.  
In 1.5 Lady Macbeth cries,  
 
Come, you spirits  
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here  
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full  
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood;  
Stop up th’access and passage to remorse, 
That no compunctious visitings of nature  
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between  
Th’effect and it!32  
 
“Unsex me here” is a line that has received ample critical attention, but I return to 
it because its implications are powerful in our current cultural and political climate 
surrounding gender and bodies. Lady Macbeth does not necessarily ask that she 
be made a man: all that she asks is to be unsexed. Yes, the following lines about 
her “woman’s breasts” and her milk indicate a doing away with her femaleness, 
but doing away with femininity does not presuppose a binary.  
However, No Fear Shakespeare interprets these lines as follows:  
 
Come, you spirits that assist murderous thoughts, 
make me less like a woman and more like a man, and fill me 
from head to toe with deadly cruelty! Thicken my blood and 
clog up my veins so I won’t feel remorse, so that no human 
compassion can stop my evil plan or prevent me from 
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No Fear Shakespeare explicitly reasserts the gender binary back into Lady 
Macbeth’s speech. “Make me less like a woman and more like a man” is a horrific 
phrase to read on the page—not because its meanings aren’t implied in 
Shakespeare, but because in the Bedford edition those meanings exist alongside a 
multiplicity of options. Options that are written out of the “translation.” 
If “unsex me here” means “make me less like a woman and more like a 
man” more than it means something else (hence the decision to translate it as such) 
hegemonic heteronormative discourses of science, medicine, and linguistics 
remove the imaginative possibility of further interpretation and re-imagination. 
What about thematic conceptions of evil as outside the human and the ensuing 
implication that one’s sex defines one’s humanity? What is implied/assumed about 
toxic masculinity? What about implications that Lady Macbeth does not want to 
be a man, but cannot imagine how she could be a woman and behave the way she 
does? How many self-identified women have yearned to do away with their 
“womanness” but didn’t seek to “be a man”? If you are the sex which is not one, 
an existence in the margins outside full humanity allows and demands a plethora 
of subject positions that move far beyond the woman/man binary, subject 
positions open for interpretation with the figurative phrase “unsex me here” but 
rendered impossible through the translation. 
We continue to conceive of gender and bodies in ways that perpetuate an 
oversimplified sexual dimorphism of humans and assert that if one is not a woman 
then one could only ever be a man. This does not seem like an irrational choice; 
the “objective reality,” according to popular belief, despite the phenomenal work 
of books like Cordelia Fine’s Delusions of Gender, is that there is a penis and a vagina 
and, therefore, there is a man and there is a woman. This argument is cissexist, 
reductive, and wholly untrue for people who are intersex, trans, and living outside 
of the gender binary, and the power of “objective reality” as it takes form through 
the discursive fields of medicine, the economy, and the legal system becomes a 
form of violence as individuals use their perception to justify denying others their 
humanity. Lady Macbeth, in one agonizing plea to the spirits, gives the battle cry 
of every human being who was told they were not one. 
Gerald Smallberg, in his essay “Bias is the Nose for the Story,” states that 
“our perceptions are crucial in apprehending truth. However, we do not 
apprehend objective reality. . . . Bias is an intuition, sensitivity, receptiveness which 
acts as a lens or filter on all our perceptions.”34 Shakespeare may have intended to 
present a female character begging to be a man; I don’t care. Language is not a 
stable geography and I am not nearly as interested in what Shakespeare intended 
as what he wrote—and what he wrote changes with time. We are currently 
pursuing and generating language to describe realities and gender identities that 
are more complicated than we have conception for—the myth of the gender 
binary has not been recently rewritten—and the line “unsex me here” still—four 
hundred years later and after reams of scholarship—holds a bounty of conceptions 
waiting to be unfurled. Every meaning made generates the possibility of rewriting 
the tired gender binary. It cannot undo the center, but close reading to generate 
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moment means the rewriting of the center. This makes Shakespeare tangible and 
alive. This uses close reading to explore not bound. 
Obviously the editors of No Fear Shakespeare close read; they made 
meaning of Shakespeare within the boundaries and limits of what the myth of 
gender presented as the most “right” answer. Barthes argues that “what the world 
supplies to myth is an historical reality . . . and what myth gives in return is a natural 
image of this  reality” and that “a conjuring trick has taken place; [myth] has turned 
reality inside out, it has emptied it of history and has filled it with nature.”35 A 
history of patriarchy written within the limits of misogyny and preserved through 
the filter of sexism makes the No Fear Shakespeare “translation” of “unsex me 
here” inevitable because it is logical. “Myth hides nothing: its function is to distort, 
not to make disappear.” 36 And the discourse of medical science, the objective 
reality of genitalia, and the fundamental uncertainty of subjectivity means gender 
may be accepted as performative, but is not actually being undone.  
Smallberg says that “bias is the thumb experience puts on the scale” and 
that “Our brains evolved having to make the right bet with limited information.”37 
I do not think people are evil or that they aren’t willing to expand their 
understanding of “human;” power is grasped, maintained, and enforced in our 
society through the wielding of authoritative discourse. Our myths feed 
signification which generates our perceptions of reality; the most powerful myths 
are still tied to positivism and objectivity even when the scientific understandings 
of both positivistic pursuit and objectivity are emptied out and distorted through 
the misunderstood trumpeting of “bias” and perversions of the uncertainty 
principle to undermine logical thinking. Myth is true because it is effective, not 
because it is factual; we rewrote the myth of knowledge to demand certainty as 
evidence of truth and forgot that people can make themselves uncertain about 
everything. In the absence of a mechanism for logically understanding uncertainty 
the causal, systematic argument falls not because of external invasion but is 
betrayed by the invasion from within. Our own significations are used against us 
because you can’t prove words—they become real when they make meaning. 
Furthermore, until recent strides in the fields of neuroscience and psychology the 
only evidence of subjectivity was words used to describe it which made it easy to 
disregard the arguments of the margins. That centuries of words about gender are 
being proven “right” through experimental science does not seem to be getting 
the headline it deserves—almost like there is something effective at work we want 
to believe more than factual information. 
Smallberg finishes his essay saying,  
 
Truth needs continually to be validated against all evidence, 
which challenges it fairly and honestly. . . . Like the words 
in a multi-dimensional crossword puzzle, it has to fit 
together with all the pieces already in place. The better and 
more elaborate the fit, the more certain the truth.38 
 
It’s a well stated point, but even here lurks a Trojan horse: whose challenge is fair 
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be precise and steadfast, but postmodernism made the case for why truth is 
uncertain—truth is a moving target. This has been accepted and subsumed into 
the myth not, ultimately, for revolution of thought, but as justification for false 
equivalencies. Adrienne Rich told us “the personal is always political” because to 
have a vagina meant inhabiting a body everyone else got a say in, but the 
experience of that body never offered qualification to speak about it. Judith Butler 
argued for the necessity of considering what constituted a “livable world” because 
the answer to that question was dependent upon the subjective experiences and 
needs of individuals and communities. There is ample evidence subjectivity must 
not be reasoned out and that when we try it is inevitably in support of the system.  
Culturally, our linguistic needs have surpassed what truths our discourses 
allow access to; it is not only about seeing or doing something new, but finding, 
creating, or repurposing signifiers for what is already there. The deconstruction 
and analysis of text is a key player in rewriting myths of gender and power and 
opening up space for more people to live freely and safely. It is this connection 
between what is real, what is possible, and what is effective that erodes attempts 
to remythologize gender and rewrite what makes a “real human.” But it is also 
through language we recognize and articulate our limits as well as push against 
them. Whether through words, art, music, or numbers we create systems of 
signification that allow us to understand what we perceive, interact with that 
perception, and then affect it. The intuition Frye blithely dismisses as random is 
actually the bias of subjective experience alerting us to moments our objective 
perception is off. Recognizing that means asking more questions, new questions, 
and hammering at those perceptions until we carve new, better, more, or 
previously unimagined significations. Like what it could mean to be unsexed from 
gender and/or body. Or what the mathematics of uncertainty would be. Or how 
time can bend. 
It is true subjectivity does not function in a revolutionary manner through 
any inevitable means; subjectivity can alert us to a myth we’ve outgrown, but our 
only means of analysis, exploration and theorizing next steps exist within those 
structures generated by myths and the system resists direct remythologization—
whatever replaces the old myth must be as effective as the previous one not simply 
factual. In writing unreal experiences into language many new significations of 
gender perpetuate the myth of gender even as they attempt to rewrite them. The 
binaries of gender and the body are failing trans people, intersex people, queer 
people—they’re failing people, but as thrilling as many conversations happening 
in the wild west of the internet about these topics are, much of what masquerades 
as revolution concerning these topics is, in actuality, in support of the institution. 
To say “I am not a woman” is not the same thing as saying “I am a man,” and to 
say “I am a woman because I like feminine things” only makes sense as it arises 
from unexamined cultural structures that demand notions of gender and the body 
remain built on a binary foundation. The plethora of terms dominating identity 
politics are exciting—pangender, agender, bigender, demi-sexual, pansexual, and 
so forth—but what do any of these terms mean outside the Saussurean definitions 
that demand we understand “pangender” as it exists in dialect and difference with 
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over the last century there is no such thing as feminine or masculine gender then what 
is pangender? We keep looking for answers, but every definition we construct is 
making meaning from the myth of gender.  
This is similar to the problem of No Fear Shakespeare. It is not enough 
to say No Fear Shakespeare is a “bad” edition because it simplifies Shakespeare; it 
is the only thing that is real and tangible to the sixth grader and that tangibility is 
necessary for meaning-making and any subsequent subjective explorations. But 
No Fear Shakespeare is paradoxically perpetuating the “reality” of the gender 
binary that very same sixth grader will someday critique with her “budding feminist 
identity.”39 Myth holds the structures together. The certainty of knowing, which 
regenerates the myth which generated it, makes No Fear Shakespeare necessary 
for a great many young readers for whom explication of Shakespeare is impossible. 
But, in order to legitimately remove the need for No Fear Shakespeare an overhaul 
of the educational system—and myths of knowledge along with who knows what 
else—would have to be undertaken. This is work no single individual could 
undertake nor is there any guarantee that such a dismantling of No Fear 
Shakespeare would actually remythologize; it is equally possible a vacuum would 
be created and filled by a new, equally bounded text that could be read with 
certainty, and would regenerate certainty in turn. 
This is why uncertainty is so necessary; whatever new conceptions of 
gender and identity are signified or constructed, either they will not feel “real” and 
“natural” as the myth goes through metamorphosis, or they will strike us as “new” 
and heretofore unimagined—new territory bringing its own kind of uncertainty 
with it. Being able to think through this uncertainty, “tolerate the ambiguity” as 
Berthoff says is necessary; one way to do this might be engaging in the work of 
Derrida’s creative tinkering through the writing of new stories and using a familiar 
methodology like close reading for unfamiliar means. We might begin by being 
critical of why we know what we know—this can be pursued by not requiring the 
certainty of an answer but by pushing for the justification of meaning. Meaning is 
uncertain—the rock star Dave Grohl summed it up when he said, “You can sing 
a song to 85,000 people and they’ll sing it back for 85,000 different reasons.”40 
The goal is not to streamline or simplify those reasons, but to develop (or in the 
case of close reading redevelop) better techniques for its analysis. Mark Dooley 
and Liam Kavanagh in The Philosophy of Derrida argue that “the impossible is 
Derrida’s guiding ideal. Just because we cannot shake off our limits does not mean 
we should not try to push against those limits.”41 Justifying meaning is the 
exploration of what made it, not the proving of its certainty.  
There is the uncertainty that comes with knowing we don’t have an 
answer or that our answer may change, but we still maintain the comforting 
promise there is an answer. And then there is the uncertainty that comes with 
knowing we have the best answer for the moment, but this moment will change 
and, thus, so must our answer. This second uncertainty requires malleability and 
movement, a continual remythologization rather than embrace and sublimation 
into existing power.  This is what Derrida explicates, I think, and it is this second 
uncertainty the humanities, in particular, are best suited to problematize and help 
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I am agitating—alongside many others who came before me—for an 
epistemological shift in how we conceive of the pursuit of knowledge and, 
specifically, what evidence means within the realm of literary studies. Close reading 
is far too often wielded by authoritative discourse as a means of maintaining and 
policing boundaries, and clinging to that authority with no emphasis on the 
necessary evolution of its methods to fit shifting discursive needs denies the 
revolutionary power inherent in all education. The requirement that students 
produce answers rather than learn to ask questions and suppress their subjective 
intuition rather than learn to recognize and harness it is the pressure of the system 
demanding we uphold it, promising only madness will come with change. 
The humanities have been at a disadvantage for some time; mathematics 
is considered the supreme system of signification and, indeed, Shakespeare never 
put anyone literally on the moon. Because sometimes the math works, even if we 
don’t always know why, science is able to pursue questions and theorize in wildly 
exciting ways all while not knowing how it will work out in the end. This 
intersection of imagination, knowledge, and experimentation has led to amazing 
discoveries and tremendous failures. The humanities, by contrast, have been under 
attack to produce quantifiable products that benefit society as defined by 
capitalistic ideologies of benefit: a.k.a. profit. We are not afforded the opportunity 
to explore the cosmos of our imaginations because our products are less tangible 
and certainly less quantifiable. Because of this we’ve been sold the lie there is no 
benefit. 
But while the imprecision and uncertainty of Shakespeare has been 
misread as difficulty indicative of product-value and used to justify the humanities 
as tangible evidence of “high culture,” his works hold real revolutionary benefits 
and are still an exciting location for exploration. Shakespeare is a difficult read 
because his language is old and out-of-touch. And that’s okay. But sometimes 
Shakespeare—like all other storytellers and generators of language—provides 
conceptual metaphors that allow readers to alter their perception of objective 
reality. And critics, making meaning out of Shakespeare’s text by reading it closely, 
can shape and reshape these subjective meanings until they best fit the crossword 
puzzle of a given moment. There is nothing unique to Shakespeare in this process, 
nothing essential, but Shakespeare has been preserved and mythologized in 
Western, and increasingly globalized, society; this means that making and re-
making meaning through Shakespeare constantly enables a better understanding 
of who we are by re-examining not only who we used to be, but also who we have 
willingly crafted ourselves into being. And then, through theories like presentism, 
queer studies, gender studies, and post-colonialism, we can push against our limits. 
Having articulated where we are, we can now explore where we aren’t.  
Shakespeare borrowed characters, plots, and narratives from those that 
came before him and he has been constituted and reconstituted in the centuries 
following his death. The undeniable reality is that Shakespeare continues to be 
considered necessary and relevant because we view “Shakespeare” as some sort of 
cultural authority, not because he is the best or only author to wrestle with such 
themes as identity, fate, love, and hate. Thirty-five years ago Eagleton stated in his 
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becoming certificated by the state as proficient in literary 
studies is a matter of being able to talk and write in certain 
ways. . . . You can think or believe what you want, as long 
as you can speak this particular language. . . . It is just that 
certain meanings and positions will not be articulable within 
it.42  
 
The intersection of the “science” of close reading and the myths of Shakespeare 
become a deadly combo. This notion of Shakespeare’s rightness means students are 
rarely empowered to make meaning with Shakespeare and critics must consistently 
produce something “new”—a product—rather than engage in conversation for 
(re)discovery that might serve revolutionary praxis. Instead as educators, we 
should heed the call: don’t tell me why everything I know is wrong—first tell my 
why everything I thought was right and how I can go from that into uncertainty 
until I find the next set of questions. Why do we think what we think? How has 
the dark energy of myth affected the probability of our answers before we even 
asked the questions? This work can be done by close reading the self (I knew I 
could work Stanley Fish in here) but also by close reading culture. Or by close 
reading science. It is not the sacrifice of logic and rigor but the recognition that 
we must sometimes go outside our box in order to articulate it. 
There is work to be done in the analysis of systems of power as they 
continue to be perpetuated through close reading and Shakespeare. Close reading 
and its position as a rigorous tool, its history as it is attached to New Criticism, 
and its continued use and misuse in conservative supremacist academic practices, 
is a moment where systemic power—mythically understood as most “true” and 
therefore justified, believable, and trustworthy—takes form in language. Eagleton 
states, “Whole social ideologies may be implicit in an apparently neutral critical 
method; and unless studying such methods takes account of this, it is likely to 
result in little more than servility to the institution itself.”43 We all agree the 
destructive authoritative power of social norms is dangerous and subject positions 
are always more loaded than they appear, but if we can also agree that all 
language—whether it be what we use to examine other language or the language 
being examined—exists in a subjective temporal position where meaning is never 
static, then we can remythologize that power into something more ethical. One 
starting point is realizing it is not possible, no matter how carefully we historicize, 
to achieve an “authentic” reading of a text; it is not even possible within our own 
current historical moment to read a text the same way twice. Or, if it is possible, 
we should seriously consider if it’s desirable.  
 If we are unafraid to close read not only what is buried in the text but also 
what is written out of it, then wherever we begin that process—Spenser, 
Shakespeare, Milton, or Wonder Woman—we have the possibility to reconfigure 
the praxis of literary criticism and its power to fight for very real, and very 
necessary change. Close reading can be analyzed as one more tool used by and for 
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and learning how to think when we don’t know the answer is a part of the 
epistemological puzzle that has been degraded and under attack for far too long. 
I am no longer interested in justifying the humanities. I am far more 
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